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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Pony Lee Jackson appeals from the denial of post-conviction relief after
an evidentiary hearing.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Jackson filed a petition seeking post-conviction relief from his conviction
for two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 16. (R., pp. 1-5.)
The state moved for summary dismissal of the petition.

(R., pp. 82-83.) The

district court granted partial summary dismissal. (R., pp. 101-32.) The remaining
claims proceeded to an evidentiary hearing (R., pp. 172-74), following which the
district court denied relief (R., pp. 197-218). Jackson timely appealed. (R., pp.
220-22.)

1

ISSUE
Jackson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in denying claims two and seven of Mr.
Jackson's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief following an
evidentiary hearing on the claims?
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Jackson failed to show error in the district court's conclusion that
Jackson failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to
opening statement and evidence that the victim disclosed the lewd conduct in
response to a police solicitation that anyone molested by Jackson come forward?
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ARGUMENT
Jackson Failed To Prove Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
Jackson claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object on

the basis that the prosecutor violated a pre-trial ruling by the court by referencing
in his opening statement and ultimately proffering evidence that the victim came
forward after hearing a police solicitation requesting Jackson's victims to come
forward. (R., pp. 28-31, 50-55.) The district court concluded that the evidence
discussed and presented by the prosecutor was admissible, and therefore there
was neither deficient performance nor prejudice from a lack of objection by trial
counsel.

(R., pp. 205-08, 213.) Jackson contends "the district court's factual

findings were clearly erroneous, and that the district court's analysis on the claim
was both legally and factually erroneous." (Appellant's brief, p. 10.) Review of
the record shows ample evidence in support of the district court's factual findings
and application of the relevant law shows no error.

B.

Standard Of Review
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters

findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings
of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of
law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274,
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998).
The credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony,
and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence are all matters solely within the
3

province of the district court. Peterson v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108,
110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has
not met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight.

Sanders v. State, 117

Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964,965 (Ct. App. 1990).

C.

The District Court Did Not Err In Concluding That The Prosecutor's
Actions Were Not Contrary To The Court's Pre-Trial Order And Therefore
Trial Counsel Was Not Ineffective For Failing To Object
The district court made the following findings regarding the claim that trial

counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's mention of a police
inquiry regarding Pony Jackson being the impetus for the victim to disclose the
prior sexual abuse to the police:
The court's instruction to the parties was that the Victim
could testify there had been a law enforcement inquiry regarding
Jackson that prompted her to contact them. But, she was to "stay
away" from the charges. The charges referred to in the Solicitation
were child pornography charges.
The prosecutor's reference to law enforcement's Solicitation
did not mention the child pornography charges and, therefore,
complied with the court's order.
(R., p. 206.)

The court concluded that the prosecutor's comments and the

victim's testimony did not violate the court's order; that the evidence that the
victim responded to a police solicitation was admissible and only the evidence
regarding possession of child pornography was inadmissible; that the lack of an
objection was not deficient performance; and that Jackson had proved no
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prejudice.

(R., pp. 208, 213. 1)

The record in the criminal case supports the

district court's findings of fact.
Jackson, through counsel, moved in limine to exclude evidence of three
things: (1) his "prior conviction ... and pending charges for child pornography,"
(2) his "written statements regarding sexual activity," and (3) an allegation
'reported to the Jefferson County Sheriff's Office in 1998 wherein an adolescent
female disclosed that Pony Jackson had sexually abused her in Jefferson
County."' (#36968 R, pp. 17-18.) At the hearing defense counsel clarified that
the first issue addressed "a television report that asked for someone to come
forward with any information about any alleged abuse by the defendant. That
had to do with child pornography charges. And so first, what we're asking for is
that any evidence of that charge and that conviction of the child pornography
charges be excluded under Rule 404." (#36968 Tr., p. 23, Ls. 2-14 (emphasis
added).)

The district court informed counsel of some potential rulings, but

reserved any final ruling on admissibility for trial. (#36968 Tr., p. 25, L. 22 - p.
27, L. 3.)
Just prior to trial the prosecutor sought clarification on the admissibility of
evidence the victim had come forward years after the abuse in response to news

The trial court also concluded that Jackson had failed to show how I.RE. 404(b)
even applied to the statement and evidence regarding the police inquiry and also
concluded that the evidence in question (and the statement regarding the same)
was admissible. (R, pp. 203-04, 206-07.) Although the statement implied and
the testimony stated that police suspected there were other victims, such is not
actually evidence of any prior bad act. By definition this evidence was not
covered by I.RE. 404(b).
Moreover, the court concluded that such was
admissible because any unfair prejudice did not outweigh the probative value of
the evidence.
1
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reports that Jackson "had been arrested for child pornography and the news said
if anyone out there has been molested by Pony Jackson, would you please
contact law enforcement." (#36968 Tr., p. 33, L. 21 - p. 34, L. 13.) The district
court stated that "evidence of charges for child pornography ... can be unfairly
prejudicial" but the victim could testify "she saw a report about Pony Jackson."
(#36968 Tr., p. 34, L. 14 - p. 35, L. 3.) The prosecutor then asked:
[The Prosecutor]: But don't mention it was on child
pornography; she saw a report?
THE COURT: Yeah, it wasn't based on child pornography
issues but that he was involved-that he was-that he was
involved-there was a law enforcement inquiry regarding Pony
Jackson and that prompted her to come forward, something
general and innocuous like that. Certainly she can talk about this
was generated by a law enforcement inquiry; but if she can stay
away from the charges, were going to be a lot better off.
(#36968 Tr., p. 35, Ls. 4-14.) The court advised the prosecutor that "right now"
he would "want to treat that as unfairly prejudicial, the prejudice doesn't outweigh
the probative value." (#36968 Tr., p. 35, L. 21 - p. 36, L. 1.)
The prosecutor in opening statement informed the jury that the victim
came forward after hearing "a report on the news that anybody who had been
molested by Pony Jackson, if they would contact the sheriff's office or law
enforcement." (#36968 Tr., p. 136, Ls. 2-9.) At trial, the prosecutor asked the
victim what "brought [her report] about," to which she responded, "My mom called
and told me that on the news they had said that Pony Jackson had been arrested
and that anybody else that had been molested by him, to please come forward."
(#36968 Tr., p. 186, Ls. 1-5.) Neither the prosecutor nor the victim referenced
child pornography.
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At the evidentiary hearing in post-conviction, the prosecutor testified that
he believed the court had granted him permission to address the news report in a
limited fashion for the purpose of bridging the gap between the sexual
molestation and the report to the police almost 15 years later. (Tr., p. 71, L. 19 p. 78, L. 15.) The defense attorney testified that his trial strategy was to rely on
the length of time between the abuse and the disclosure and the lack of
corroboration to attack the victim's credibility. (Tr., p. 111, Ls. 5-11.) He moved
to exclude evidence under I.RE. 404(b). (Tr., p. 107, L. 25 - p. 108, L. 14.) He
also testified that although he had no recollection of the specific part of the
opening statement regarding the news report, he generally did not object in
opening statement unless an opening statement is egregious or prejudicial. (Tr.,
p. 111, L. 22- p. 113, L. 9.)

He likewise had no recollection of the victim's

testimony about hearing about the news report, but believed that an objection
would have been sustained. (Tr., p. 113, L. 10 - p. 114, L. 15.)
The district court's findings are supported by the record.

The record

establishes that a news report stated that Jackson had been charged for
possession of child pornography and police were requesting that anyone
molested by Jackson come forward. Trial Counsel moved to exclude evidence
related to possession of child pornography and succeeded.

Counsel did not

move to exclude evidence that the police had solicited anyone who had been
molested to come forward. The court's order must be considered in light of the
motion it was granting, and the motion was clearly related to child pornography
and not the police solicitation.
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The district court's factual findings that neither the prosecutor's opening
statement nor the victim's testimony violated the pre-trial ruling of the district
court is dispositive of Jackson's claims his attorney was ineffective for failing to
object on the basis of the pre-trial ruling. In order to prove a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both
deficient performance and resulting prejudice.

Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d
299, 307 (1989).

An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient

unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a
strong presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P.2d 283, 286
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989).
"[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts
relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable .... "
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
presumption of competence."
1388, 1407 (2011 ).

Strickland v.

The court must apply a "strong

Cullen v. Pinholster, _

U.S. _ , 131 S.Ct.

To overcome the presumption of competence the party

claiming deficient performance must prove that the strategic decision to not
object "resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or
other shortcomings capable of objective review." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548,
561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008). See also Hinton v. Alabama,_ U.S._, 134
S.Ct. 1081, 1088-89 (2014) (counsel's decision to not seek additional expert
witness at state expense deficient because counsel was unaware of law allowing
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him to do so). "Failing to object to arguably inadmissible testimony will generally
be insufficient to overcome the presumption that the decision was based on
sound legal strategy." Cook v. State,

-

Idaho

-, -

P.3d -

, 2014 WL

4290413, *3 (Ct. App. 2014). 2 Prejudice is found only if petitioner shows "that
counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial
whose result is reliable."

Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369 (1993)

(quotations omitted).
Jackson's claim was based entirely upon the assertion that the
prosecutor's opening statement and the victim's testimony were excludable as
being contrary to the district court's pre-trial ruling. That pre-trial ruling prohibited
mention of the child pornography possession and charges, but allowed evidence
that the victim came forward in response to a police solicitation. It did not prohibit
the state from addressing what information the police had solicited. Indeed, what
information the police solicited was central to the relevance of the disclosure.
The prosecutor thereafter included in his statement the representation that the
evidence would show that the victim came forward and reported the lewd
conduct to the police in response to a police solicitation for information from
"anybody who had been molested by Pony Jackson" (#36968 Tr., p. 136, Ls. 2-9)
and elicited testimony from the witness that she had reported the lewd conduct in

Much of Jackson's sufficiency of the evidence argument seems to be premised
on the evidence not affirmatively establishing a tactical reason for the lack of
objections. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 27-31.) Because there is a presumption
that counsel was effective and a presumption that a lack of objection was a
tactical choice, Jackson had the burden of proving an objective deficiency such
as inadequate preparation or ignorance of the law. This correct legal standard
should be applied to his arguments.
2
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response to a police request that "anybody else that had been molested by him,
to please come forward" (#36968 Tr., p. 186, Ls. 1-5). Because the district court
did not proscribe the state from presenting evidence showing what information
the police were seeking, Jackson's counsel was not objectively deficient for
claiming it had, and Jackson suffered no prejudice.
On appeal Jackson acknowledges that neither the prosecutor nor the
victim "specifically reference [the] possession of child pornography charges"
subject to the trial court's order, but claims they "referenced something arguably
worse." (Appellant's brief, p. 18.) The flaw in this argument is that Jackson did
not claim ineffective assistance of counsel for not objecting to "something
arguably worse" than the evidence excluded in the pre-trial ruling, but claimed
that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting "to the prosecutor's blatant and
deliberate disregard of the court's order" or the "victim's actual testimony when it
violated the district court's order." (R., pp. 39, 63.) Jackson is effectively trying
to amend his petition on appeal rather than show error in the district court's ruling
on the claim he actually made.
Jackson's argument that the court ordered the prosecutor to say
something "general and innocuous" likewise fails. The court did not rule on an
issue not before it.

Although the court used an example and encouraged

"something general and innocuous like that" example, such was in the context of
stating the victim should "stay away from the charges." (#36948 Tr., p. 34, L. 25
- p. 36, L. 1.) The court never held that the state could not inform the jury what
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information had been sought in the police solicitation that prompted the victim to
come forward. 3 Thus, it was simply not ineffective counsel to claim that it had.
Jackson failed to prove any objective deficiency in counsel's performance
by not claiming that the prosecutor had violated the trial court's pre-trial order.
Likewise, he failed to prove any prejudice.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the judgment of the
district court.

DATED this 20th day of January, 2015.

,0\
l\\\iwti"rr.~~
Deputy Attorney

The distinction between the prior bad acts evidence of possession of child
pornography and evidence of what information the police were seeking (which is
not itself a prior bad act) is also important in the district court's analysis of the
admissibility of the evidence. (R., pp. 203-04, 206-08.) This distinction is lost on
Jackson, who apparently believes that the evidence was admitted to show that
he has sexually abused other children. (Appellant's brief, pp. 21-26.) Because
evidence that the victim disclosed her sexual abuse in response to a police
request for just that sort of information was admissible, there was neither
deficient performance nor prejudice. The district court may be affirmed on this
alternative basis.
3
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ELIZABETH A. ALLRED
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Deputy Attorn
KKJ/pm
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